Cryptanalysis of Song's advanced smart card based password
  authentication protocol by Tapiador, Juan E. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
11
1.
27
44
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
1 N
ov
 20
11
Cryptanalysis of Song’s advanced smart card based
password authentication protocol
Juan E. Tapiador1,∗, Julio C. Hernandez-Castro2
Pedro Peris-Lopez3, John A. Clark1,
1 Department of Computer Science, University of York, UK
∗ Corresponding author. E-mail: jet@cs.york.ac.uk
2 School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, UK
3 Security Lab, Faculty of EEMCS, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands
May 24, 2018
Abstract
Song [8] proposed very recently a password-based authentication
and key establishment protocol using smart cards which attempts to
solve some weaknesses found in a previous scheme suggested by Xu,
Zhu, and Feng [9]. In this paper, we present attacks on the improved
protocol, showing that it fails to achieve the claimed security goals.
1 Introduction
Remote user authentication is a central problem in network security. In
a seminal paper, Lamport [5] proposed in 1981 a password-based scheme
using hash chains. This scheme was later refined and used in a number of
applications, notably Haller’s famous S/KEY one-time password system [2].
Similar protocols based on smart cards gained some popularity shortly after
that. In such schemes, the user is provided with a card and a password
as identification tokens. When the user wishes to connect to the server,
she provides the card with her password, which is used to construct a login
message that is sent to the server to be validated. More sophisticate schemes
force the server to be authenticated too, and also provide both parties with
a shared secret (a session key) after the completion of the protocol.
The common adversary model to analyze the security of authentication
protocols based on smart cards assumes an attacker with full control over the
communication channel between the user and the server. Consequently, all
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S Server
A User
IDA User A’s identity
PWA User A’s password
RA One-time random number generated by A
TA, TS User A and server’s timestamps, respectively
∆T Time threshold predefined by the protocol
p, q Large prime numbers such that p = 2q + 1
x ∈ Z∗q Server’s secret key
⊕ Bitwise XOR operation
‖ Concatenation operation
h(·) A secure one-way hash function
EK(M),DK(M) Encryption/Decryption of message M with key K
Figure 1: Notation used in Song’s protocol.
the messages exchanged can be intercepted, deleted, modified, or fabricated
by the attacker. Additionally, protocols must assume that the attacker can
temporarily get access to the user’s smart card and the information stored in
it, either directly (e.g. stealing the card or deceiving the user so she inserts
the card in a malicious reader) or indirectly by observing emanations or
other side channels [4, 7].
Very recently, Song [8] showed various attacks against one of such pro-
tocols suggested by Xu, Zhu, and Feng [9]. The paper also presents an
improved version, loosely based on the original scheme, which attempts to
amend the identified vulnerabilities. In particular, Song claims that [8]:
“The interactive authentication messages must not reduce the entropy of the
password”, and also: “The adversary must not be able to attack and gain
access to the system by extracting the data stored on the smart card”. In this
paper, we present practical attacks showing that the protocol suggested by
Song fails to achieve these goals.
2 Review of Song’s scheme
We first give a brief description of Song’s scheme as presented in [8]. The
notation used in the protocol is summarized in Fig. 1.
Initially, the server selects two large prime numbers p and q such that
p = 2q + 1, and a secret key x ∈ Z∗q . Both p and x are kept secret. The
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User A Server S
Registration phase
Select IDA, PWA
IDA,PWA−−−−−−−→ BA = h(ID
x mod p)⊕ h(PWA)
Smart card
←−−−−−−− Store IDA, BA in the card
Login and authentication
Input IDA, PWA
Select RA
KA = BA ⊕ h(PWA)
WA = EKA(RA ⊕ TA)
CA = h(TA ‖ RA ‖WA ‖ IDA)
IDA,CA,WA,TA−−−−−−−−−−−→ Verify IDA, TA
KA = h(ID
x mod p)
R′A = DKA(WA)⊕ TA
C′A = h(TA ‖ R
′
A ‖WA ‖ IDA)
Verify: CA
?
= C′A
CS = h(IDA ‖ R
′
A ‖ TS)
IDA,CS ,TS←−−−−−−−−
Verify IDA, TS
C′S = h(IDA ‖ RA ‖ TS)
Verify CS
?
= C′S
Compute session key
sk = h(IDA ‖ TS ‖ TA ‖ RA) sk = h(IDA ‖ TS ‖ TA ‖ R
′
A)
Figure 2: Song’s protocol.
protocol consists of four main phases (see Fig. 2).
2.1 Registration phase
The user A sends to S her identity IDA and password PWA through a secure
channel. The server then computes BA = h(ID
x mod p)⊕ h(PWA), stores
both IDA and BA in a smart card and sends it to A.
2.2 Login phase
User A attachs her smart card to a reader and enters her identity and pass-
word. The card chooses a random number RA, obtains the current times-
tamp TA, and computes:
KA = BA ⊕ h(PWA)
WA = EKA(RA ⊕ TA)
CA = h(TA ‖ RA ‖WA ‖ IDA)
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It then sends the login message {IDA, CA,WA, TA} to the server.
2.3 Authentication phase
2.3.1 User Authentication
Upon receiving the login request at time T ∗, S first checks A’s identity and
then validates the timestamp by checking that (T ∗−TA) ≤ ∆T . The server
computes a local version of the session key as KA = h(ID
x mod p) and then
recovers the nonce by doing RA = DKA(WA) ⊕ TA). It then computes a
local version of CA and checks whether it coincides with the received value.
If the verification goes through successfully, the user is authenticated and
S sends her the message {IDA, CS , TS}, where TS is the server’s timestamp
and CS = h(IDA ‖ RA ‖ TS).
2.3.2 Server authentication
Upon receviving the server’s last message, A validates the identity and the
timestamp, and verifies that the received CS coincides with a local version
computed by her using the original nonce. If that is the case, then S is
authenticated.
2.3.3 Session key establishment
Once both A and S are mutually authenticated, they compute a shared
secret session key sk = h(IDA ‖ TS ‖ TA ‖ RA), which is used to encrypt
future communications.
2.4 Password change
Whenever the user wants to change her password, she first goes through
the authentication protocol. Upon receving the successful authentication
confirmation from the server, A introduces her new password PW newA and
the smart card updates the value of BA by doing
1 BnewA = BA ⊕ h(PWA)⊕
h(PW newA ).
1We note that the actual formulation of the update process described in [8] is BnewA =
BA ⊕ PWA ⊕ PW
new
A , which is clearly erroneous.
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3 Cryptanalysis
3.1 Off-line password guessing attack
In [8] it is claimed that “the adversary must not be able to attack and gain
access to the system by extracting the data stored on the smart card.” How-
ever, an adversary who obtains the value BA = h(ID
x mod p) ⊕ h(PWA)
can easily mount an off-line password guessing attack by simply observing
one correct authentication session and getting access to the values WA and
CA.
The attack works as follows. For each candidate password PW ∗A, the
attacker computes the tentative encryption key K∗A = BA ⊕ h(PW
∗
A). Such
a key is then used to recover the candidate nonce value R∗A by first decrypt-
ing WA with K
∗
A and then XORing the result with TA (both of which are
public); that is, R∗A = DK∗A(WA)⊕TA. Note that, if the attempted password
PW ∗A is correct (i.e., PW
∗
A = PWA), then so it is the obtained encryption
key K∗A and, consequently, the nonce R
∗
A. Now, CA can be used to check
if that is the case: The attacker computes C∗A = h(TA ‖ R
∗
A ‖ WA ‖ IDA)
and, if it coincides with CA, she can conclude that R
∗
A is correct and so the
candidate password tried. (In this reasoning we assume that h has no colli-
sions. Nevertheless, even if h is not ideal, additional eavesdropped sessions
can be used to rule out false positives and identify the correct password).
In short, contrarily to what is claimed in [8], the messages exchanged
during the protocol do indeed reduce the entropy of the password, at least
for an attacker with access to the values stored in the card. Furthermore,
once the password is guessed, the scheme offers no protection against other
attacks, from simply clonning the card and impersonating the user, to re-
covering every session key established using the password. We elaborate on
this in what follows.
3.2 Poor reparability
One particularly weak feature of Song’s scheme is that the same key, namely
KA = h(ID
x mod p), is always used to encrypt (RA ⊕ TA) during the login
phase, regardless of the protocol session and during the entire life of the
smart card. In general terms, this is not a recommendable practice, as it
makes difficult to restore the security offered by the protocol when the user
suspects that the password has been compromised.
To further clarify this, suppose that an attacker has successfully guessed
the password as described above. With the information learnt she can now
obtain the card’s long-term secret h(IDx mod p), which could be used to
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fabricate a clonned card, perhaps with a different password. Even if the
legitimate user suspects that the password may have been guessed, changing
it does not alleviate the situation, as the same key will still be used regardless
of the new password chosen! Therefore, the attacker can still impersonate
the user as well as get access to future sessions keys.
The only mechanism available to the user to recover from the fact that a
password has been compromised is registering again with the server using a
different identity and cancelling the current one, which is clearly unaccept-
able.
3.3 Lack of perfect forward secrecy
A trivial consequence of using the same encryption key across sessions is that
the scheme does not offer perfect forward secrecy2. Once KA is obtained
(e.g., by guessing the password once), all previously established sessions keys
can be easily computed, irrespective of the password used in past.
3.4 Exploitation of incremental hash functions
During the last part of the protocol, the server sends to the user the value
CS = h(IDA ‖ R
′
A ‖ TS), along with IDA and TS . This construction may
be extremely dangerous if h is an incremental hash function (e.g., Merkle-
Damg˚ard [6]) without a convenient finalization stage. (We note that the
majority of current standarized cryptographic hash algorithms fall in this
category.) If such is the case, an attacker can intercept the message and,
using CS and TS , go backwards through the hash algorithm and recover the
internal state exactly at the point where the input (IDA ‖ R
′
A) has just being
processed. Now, the attacker can choose a slightly different timestamp, say
T attS , such that it will still be acceptable for the user (for example, T
att
S =
TS ± ǫ, with ǫ a small quantity). Using the previously recovered internal
state, the attacker can compute a new value CattS = h(IDA ‖ R
′
A ‖ T
att
S ),
which will be forwarded to the user along with T attS . Note that the user
cannot detect the forgery as long as the timestamp is valid, so CattS will
be accepted as a proof of having obtained the previously sent nonce RA.
However, both user and server will compute different values for the session
key (as it depends on TS) and they will not be able to further communicate
securely even though the protocol has finished correctly.
2A key establishment protocol is said to offer perfect forward secrecy if the disclosure
of one secret does not compromise previously established sessions [1, 3]
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4 Conclusions
We have presented an off-line password guessing attack on Song’s protocol,
and shown that it also has some other weaknesses despite its designer’s
claims. Unfortunately, being insecure seems to be the common denominator
of the vast majority of the schemes proposed to date. As in the case of some
other related areas, more detailed security analyses need to be performed.
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